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Abstract
This study attempts to critically assess the
democratizing potential of “CrowdLaw,” a form of
online participation that its practitioners describe as
crowdsourced policy-making. To do so, the study
analyzes both the statements of Crowdlaw practitioners
gathered at the third “online global conference on
#CrowdLaw” and the design and performance of the
CrowdLaw platforms for which the author could find a
sufficiently complete online presence. Findings about
the democratizing potential of CrowdLaw are mixed: on
the one hand, the analysis of practitioners’ statements
reveals an intention to create broad participation, and
discussion forums that encourage deliberation. On the
other, a look at the platforms’ design and performance
reveals an uneven and incomplete implementation of
these intentions.

1. Introduction
The democratizing promise of the Internet has been a
familiar trope since the beginning of the Internet.
Scholars have both hoped and doubted that it could act
as an extension of the public sphere [1-4]. With digital
technology becoming increasingly ubiquitous, initiatives
to democratize participation have sprouted up
everywhere in workplace or in government settings [5].
Some have made the case that the Internet will make
government more democratic by making citizen
engagement more feasible [6-8]. Others have been more
cautious, arguing that widespread enthusiasm about the
Internet as a magic tool to increase participation has yet
to be followed up by any true changes in the
participatory structure of government [5]. A large
literature has emerged pointing out that the Internet has
not only a decentralizing logic, but also a centralizing
logic through its data collection and processing
capabilities [9, 10].
Given these debates, surprisingly little has been
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written about the bulk of these “democratizing”
innovations that have attempted to alter existing
decision-making structures. The writing that has
attempted to survey some of these new approaches to
participation usually starts from the assumption that
Web 2.0 tools are democratizing [6, 11]. Some critical
work on online participation systems does exist in
academia, but it is usually on systems developed by the
researchers themselves [12, 13]. Very little critical
work on approaches developed outside of the academic
setting exists yet.
This study is an attempt to fill this gap, by
examining a selection of projects featured in the third
“online global conference on CrowdLaw,” a conference
organized by the Governance Lab (or GovLab for
short), a research lab based at NYU’s Tandon School of
Engineering. The projects all share in common the
same feature, which their proponents claim to be a
democratizing innovation: a “CrowdLaw platform,” an
online space created in order to crowdsource policy
ideas from lay citizens. CrowdLaw, according to the
GovLab’s
website,
is
“open,
collaborative
crowdsourced lawmaking,” a “tech-enabled approach
for drafting legislation or constitutions” that provides a
channel for regular citizens to contribute to
policymaking [14].
Using all the evidence that could be collected on
the CrowdLaw projects (including CrowdLaw
practitioners’ statements that the author could find
during and outside of the conference, and available data
about some of the platforms’ design and performance
that could be found online), the author scrutinizes both
the theoretical assumptions underpinning CrowdLaw
practitioners’ intervention, and the functioning of their
platforms, in order to attempt to answer the question of
whether “CrowdLaw platforms” are capable of living
up to their alleged democratizing potential.

1.1. The CrowdLaw model
The CrowdLaw projects are noteworthy because of
the very particular position that they occupy in the
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network of Web 2.0 participation innovators: To begin
with, the conference brought together projects from
eight different countries and four different continents,
and featured government actors, entrepreneurs, party
representatives, think tanks, a representative from the
U.N., and private citizens. The GovLab, the research
lab that featured them, is a pretty important actor in the
open governance movement that gained some steam
under the Obama administration: Most notably, its
founder, Beth Noveck, was appointed the first United
States Deputy Chief Technology Officer under
President Obama in 2008, and the director of the White
House Open Government Initiative (2009-2011) [6].
The open governance model of partipation, as Noveck
and the GovLab see it, consists of leveraging the
untapped expertise of citizens in order to increase the
efficacy and legitimacy of institutions [6, 15]. The
vision of participation that Noveck lays out in her book
Smart Citizens, Smarter State (2015), consists largely
of the crowdsourcing of “citizen” skills.
However, CrowdLaw, which the Governance Lab
defines as “open, collaborative crowdsourced
lawmaking” [14], goes by definition beyond Noveck’s
model of crowdsourced participation: it is hard to
imagine providing input into a legislative process that
wouldn’t be at least partly normative. In addition, the
practitioners featured at the conference presented a
model of participation that was sometimes more akin to
deliberation than to conventional crowdsourcing.
Deliberation is discussion with the goal of reaching a
solution to a problem without an objective solution,
such as a normative problem. Ideally it involves all the
people who are governed by the decision and helps to
find a solution that is closer to the common good [16].
Many theorists put strict restrictions on the nature of the
discussion that can qualify as deliberation, but at the
very least, it should involve the give and take of
arguments, and the ability of participants to revise their
opinions in light of evidence [17].
From the outset we can note that there is at least a
potential tension between the GovLab’s and Noveck’s
notion of participation, and the model of participation
that CrowdLaw practitioners seem to ascribe to. This
study finds that CrowdLaw participants’ model of
participation does indeed come closer to deliberation
than to crowdsourcing, though in terms of their
understanding of their participants and of digital
technology as a tool to harness online participation, the
difference from Noveck is less clear. A look at the
platform interfaces works to additionally blur this
distinction, and also punctures the idea that online
platforms can be effective tools to harness participation
in and of themselves. More importantly, the study finds
no convincing evidence that the projects alter the
balance of power in favor of the participants. Based on

this, the study argues for an updated model of
participation and for more transparency surrounding
efforts from power holders to “democratize”
participation.
In the next section the study attempts to situate
CrowdLaw within a larger movement of e-participation
initiatives that claim to be changing existing decisionmaking structures, and give a detailed description of the
CrowdLaw platforms featured at the conference. Section
3 presents an analysis of CrowdLaw practitioners’
statements and of the CrowdLaw platform interfaces.
Section 4 will give an overview and a discussion of the
findings, before ending with conclusions and
recommendations.

2. Background
2.1. CrowdLaw in context
The Governance Lab defines CrowdLaw as “open,
collaborative
crowdsourced
lawmaking”
[14].
Crowdsourcing is “an open call for anyone to participate
in an online task” [18]. Noveck, in her book, gives a
whole series of examples of what this crowdsourcing
can look like, from “citizen scientists” helping to
classify images from the Hubble Space Telescope,
through enlisting the help of volunteers to build crisis
maps from social media reports in an environmental
disaster, to building software applications that keep
databases of volunteers who can perform CPR, and can
alert them in case of an emergency (2015) [6]. Most of
her examples have in common that they either rely on
people’s localized knowledge, expertise, volunteer
labor, or a combination of the three. Crowdsourcing the
way Noveck describes it can include examples of peer
production, like Wikipedia. It also includes
crowdfunding efforts like Kickstarter or Indiegogo.
CrowdLaw distinguishes itself from most of these
interventions in two ways: first, it seeks to crowdsource
input from participants on their policy preferences, and
not just their skills, knowledge, or time. And secondly,
it departs from the unidirectional mode of input in
traditional crowdsourcing by attempting to encourage
dialogue on its platforms. Aitamurto and Landemore
(2016) do perhaps the best job at characterizing the type
of participation that CrowdLaw practitioners are trying
to generate on their platforms: they call it crowdsourced
deliberation, and describe it as “an open, asynchronous,
depersonalized, and distributed kind of online
deliberation occurring among self-selected participants
in the context of an attempt by government or another
organization to open up the policymaking or lawmaking
process” (p.174) [19]. Perhaps surprisingly, the most
prevalent kind of intervention that could qualify as
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crowdsourced deliberation is crowdsourced or
participatory constitution making.
Crowdsourced
constitution making efforts attempt to involve the public
in the drafting or revision of their constitution,
sometimes in more participatory ways by allowing them
input into the process (how binding it is is another
matter), and sometimes in ways that seem primarily
designed to generate buy-in in the population. Judging
from the literature, these participatory constitution
making processes seem to be concentrated in Arab and
Scandinavian countries [20-22]

2.2. Description of the CrowdLaw platforms
The third “online global conference on CrowdLaw”
took place on September 24th, 2015, and brought
together nine different speakers from eight different
countries and four different continents [23] (see Table
1).
Project
name

Presenter

Country of
application

Legislation
Lab

Tarik Nesh Nash,
platform developer

Constitucion
de Todos
Platform
Libya
Neos Lab

Daniela Hirsch

Morocco,
Kurdistan,
Somalia,
Chile

Sean Deely, UN

Libya

yes

Joseph Lentsch,
member of Neos party
academy
Victoria Alsina, visiting
scholar at Harvard
Ben Kallos (NYC
councilmember)
Cristiano Ferri,
Brazilian house of
representatives

Austria

yes

Spain

yes

United
States
Brazil

no

Podemos
/
Hacker Lab

Open
Ministry
Marco Civil,
Plataforma
Brasil,
Mudamos

Joonas Pekkanen,
Finland
platform developer
Ronaldo Lemos, from the Brazil
think tank Instituto de
Tecnologia & Sociedade
do Rio

Included
in the
analysis?
yes

yes

no

yes
yes

Table 1. Crowdlaw Projects
It featured a broad variety of different projects:
three involving constitution review platforms deployed
in Chile, Kurdistan, and Libya, two spearheaded by new
political parties in Spain and Austria to give their
supporters an online platform for policy debate, and four
projects spearheaded by two independent think tanks in
Brazil and Finland intended to crowdsource citizen
suggestions on specific policy issues in order to inform
the legislative process of their respective countries. Two
additional projects involved politicians in New York
City and Brazil, and were more geared toward providing
tools to politicians to reach out to the population than to

extending citizens’ opportunities for political
participation, and so will not be considered in detail
here.
Three speakers presented projects applying two
different online constitution review platforms,
Legislation Lab and Icon Libya. Legislation Lab is a
generic online platform intended to allow participants to
review and debate over the text of a constitution (or
other legislation) that was deployed in different places,
including Chile and Kurdistan. Icon Libya is a more
complex platform that was deployed in Libya in 2011,
shortly after the fall of Gaddafi, as part of a UN effort to
involve the Libyan population in the post-conflict
transition. The platform allows for tiered participation,
allowing all platform users to seek information and
express their opinion about the constitution-drafting
effort, and a small minority of participants to actually
help draft the constitution, or at the very least a “civil
society constitution.”
The projects spearheaded by the European parties,
Podemos in Spain and Neos in Austria, were intended to
encourage broader citizen participation in policy
development. Podemos and Neos are two opposition
parties that sprung up in the wake of 2011 wave of
protests in Europe. Both ran on a platform of extending
and strengthening democratic participation [24, 25].
Podemos’ project was supported by two platforms, Plaza
Podemos and Appgree, one of which was meant to
provide a space for Podemos followers to deliberate, and
the other one was designed to crowdsource policy
proposals, and allow the public to rank them through up
votes or down votes. The Neos party had the Neos Lab
platform, which supports online discussion groups on
different policy issues, and allows them to develop white
papers on these issues.
Finally, the projects developed by independent think
tanks were designed to close the gap between citizens
and government in the policy-making process, by
crowdsourcing policy suggestions from the population
and feeding them into the legislative process. The
Finnish project, Open Ministry, was launched as a
response to a constitutional amendment in 2012 that
guaranteed crowdsourced policy proposals with 50,000
votes or more a hearing in parliament [26]. Open
Ministry was created to provide assistance to citizens and
civil society organizations that needed help generating
enough support for their proposals and ensuring a fair
hearing for them in parliament. The Brazilian think
thank Institute for Technology and Society Rio
developed three platforms, Marco Civil, Plataforma
Brasil, and Mudamos, to crowdsource popular input on
specific policy issues. The Marco Civil platform was
meant to elicit popular feedback on Internet policy, and
was deployed as part of the process that resulted in the
passage of the “Marco Civil da Internet” legislation in
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2014 [27], and the Plataforma Brasil and Mudamos
platforms were meant to elicit feedback on issues of
political reform and public security.

3. Analysis
This section will go over the available evidence to tell
whether CrowdLaw lives up to its democratizing
potential. Section 3.1 will go over practitioners’
discourse about CrowdLaw, and section 3.2 will review
existing CrowdLaw platform interfaces.

3.1. What practitioners tell us about CrowdLaw
3.1.1. Method of discourse analysis. To gain a more
critical understanding of the CrowdLaw model of online
participation, and of its potential to democratize the
process of legislation drafting, the study starts by
examining the conference participants’ discourse on
CrowdLaw, in order, on the one hand, to tease out
practitioners’ understandings of what CrowdLaw is and
is meant to achieve, and on the other, to relate these
understandings to academic models of online
participation, and broader scholarly theory on
democracy and the Internet.
The author started by partially transcribing the
statements of the seven participants whom she judged to
be presenting on online participation platforms, focusing
on statements about who the platform was meant to
reach, and what kind of participation they wanted the
platform to support, as well as how digital technology
was believed to contribute to any of these things. The
author then iteratively went through the transcribed
statements and tried to identify the core arguments made
by the participants. Once a core argument was
identified, the author went through all the transcribed
statements again and tried to pick out all the statements
making that argument, as well as all the statements
making a contradictory argument.
The findings were supplemented with two different
types of supporting evidence: two pieces of outside
writing by conference participants on the topic of
CrowdLaw (one by Lemos et al. (2014) [28] about the
Marco Civil platform, and another by Deely and Nesh
Nash (2014) [29], the speakers for Icon Libya and
Legislation Lab, on my.con, another constitution
drafting platform), and the mission statements on the
Marco Civil and Neos Lab websites.
3.1.2. CrowdLaw participants according to
practitioners. The statements of CrowdLaw
practitioners reveal that they think of the question “who
do we want to include in our platforms?” ways that are
broadly consistent with Noveck’s model of

crowdsourced online participation: in terms of the types
of people that they want to involve in their online
participation platforms, who they are generally stays
undefined, or they are simply called “citizens” (Nesh
Nash, Alsina, Pekkanen). Among the speakers, there is
also an understanding that they want to extend
participation to citizens who weren’t previously
involved in the policy-making process: Lentsch, from
the Neos Lab, speaks of a “mission to find a different
approach to politics, to make it more open - as an open
laboratory for new politics” (29:20). Other speakers
don’t make their goal of extending citizen participation
through technology explicit, but it is apparent, for
example, in Alsina’s and Pekkanen’s citing of their
usage statistics: Alsina claims that 15,000 people
regularly use Plaza Podemos, while Pekkanen mentions
that Open Ministry was involved in six out of the
thirteen initiatives that reached the 50,000 vote
threshold.
The speakers also share Noveck’s and her research
lab’s assumption that digital technology is the tool of
choice to harness this kind of participation. Lemos, for
example, thinks of technology as a tool to promote civic
participation. Nesh Nash echoes some of Noveck’s
bolder claims about the disruptive potential of digital
technology to change our mode of governance:
We believe that Legislation Lab could be a powerful
tool for participatory democracy (…) We feel we are
on the verge of this disruptive change, that's had the
role of closing this important gap between the
governments and the public, to strengthen the culture
of the rule of law (7:20 of the Crowdlaw conference).

But at another moment, Nesh Nash acknowledges the
limitations of his online platform for generating
participation, speaking of the need to supplement it with
a mobile presence, for example. Deely speaks of the
necessity to supplement the online platform with a
multi-media campaign and in-person consultations and
negotiations . Lemos et al. (2014), in their description of
the Marco Civil process, make the same argument [28].
So while the practitioners express the same optimism
about the potential of digital technology to extend
political participation as Noveck does, some of them
also acknowledge some limitations that the online
format can have.
It is also interesting to note that when practitioners
do define who the “citizens” are to whom they want to
extend participation, some important differences
emerge: For Hirsch, from La Constitucion de Todos,
involving more people in the policy making process
means not having the process confined to experts:
What I'd like to see is it becomes a little bit more
common sense that anyone can participate in the
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lawmaking process and legislation process, that it's not
just for specialists or just for legislators (2:00:30).

Deely, on the other hand, puts a similar emphasis as
Noveck on expertise, describing Icon Libya as a tiered
participation system, where everyone can go to inform
themselves and testify on their own experience, but only
a few technical experts and advocates can contribute to
the drafting of the constitution, or the civil society
version of the constitution. And both Deely, speaking
about Icon Libya, and Lemos et al. (2014), writing about
Marco Civil, describe a multi-stakeholder policymaking process, where only one of the stakeholders is
civil society, and other stakeholders include NGOs and
universities for Icon Libya, and corporate and
government actors in the case of Marco Civil [28].
One other notion of who are the intended
participants surfaces in Nesh Nash’s and Deely’s
remarks: Nesh Nash mentions an application of
Legislation Lab in Kurdistan, where the platform is
meant to help “ a minority rights group (…) deal with
the tyranny of the majority” (8:10). And Deely makes
the argument that the online format allows minority
groups and women to participate in the constitutionmaking process in a way that they couldn’t if they had
to go to a public event. Both seem to gesture at a
pluralist model of participation that emphasizes equal
access to political power for different groups in society
[16, 30]. Deely and Nesh Nash adopt the pluralist model
more clearly in the article they co-authored about
my.con in 2014:
Self-selecting representatives of civil society
organizations representing minorities, people with
disabilities or other traditionally marginalized groups
or communities, and people with specific expertise can
be invited to contribute to the drafting of particular
provisions or articles or to provide feedback on drafts
prepared by the responsible thematic committee or
subcommittee (p.11) [29]

In summary, while most of the time practitioners
remain vague about who they mean by “CrowdLaw
participants,” when they do specify it more clearly, it
becomes apparent that their understanding of it is not
straightforward, and that they may not be in agreement
about what that understanding is: Some of the time,
when speakers specify in more detail who their
participants are, their views align with those of
Noveck’s, as when they see their platform’s role as
tapping into society’s latent expertise. Sometimes, their
understanding of their participants is arguably more
democratic than Noveck’s, as when they draw on
egalitarian or pluralist notions of participation. But at
other times, their description of their own platforms

reveals a tiered
undemocratic.

participation

system

that

is

3.1.3. The CrowdLaw model of participation
according to practitioners. So far, we’ve seen that
practitioners’ notions about who their intended
participants are, and how technology contributes to
reaching them, largely overlap with Noveck’s, with a
few exceptions. In terms of the model of participation
that CrowdLaw practitioners are trying to achieve,
we’ve already seen that it deviates from Noveck’s in
two important way: First, because by definition it
crowdsources normative input from participants.
Second, because while the platforms incorporated some
traditional crowdsourcing elements, with the exception
of Open Ministry, all but one of the projects considered
in this paper included a platform intended to facilitate
discussion.
The CrowdLaw practitioners’ statements mirror this
departure from Noveck’s model: Some of the speakers
do refer to approaches that resemble traditional
crowdsourcing: Deely, for example, speaks of a feature
on the Icon Libya platform that would allow participants
to upload 30-second videos of themselves, the best of
which could be stitched together to present to drafters at
the end of the constitution process. Alsina describes
Appgree, one of the platforms used by Podemos, as
designed to crowdsource proposals and rank them
through up or down votes.
But both speakers also describe online discussion
forums as part of their projects, and most of the
practitioners’ statements about the nature of the
participation on their platforms are more consistent
with political deliberation: for example, Alsina
describes Plaza Podemos as “a place of contact and
debate for all followers of Podemos in order to share
their thoughts and ideas” (37:15). And Nesh Nash
describes Reforme.ma, the precursor to Legislation Lab,
as “a platform that allowed citizens to analyze and
discuss the text of the constitution” (6:00). Lemos et al.
(2014) even referred to the type of participation they
were trying to achieve on Marco Civil as “deliberation”
(p.4).
The nature of the debate, discussion or deliberation
that practitioners were trying to generate on their
platforms is not theorized during the conference, but a
look at Deely and Nesh Nash’s (2014) writing outside
of the conference betrays an influence of deliberative
theory that is unmistakable. For instance, they write:
[Public debate] contributes to reconciling different
points of view (…) Through informed discussion and
debate citizens test and challenge the opinions and
arguments of others, and may be compelled to accept a
particular conclusion (p.8) [26].
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The properties they attribute to public debate bear some
resemblance to the properties attributed by Chambers to
deliberation:
Deliberation is debate and discussion aimed at
producing reasonable, well-informed opinions in which
participants are willing to revise preferences in light of
discussion, new information, and claims made by
fellow participants (p.309) [31].

In addition, Deely and Nesh Nash (2014) write:
Debated in public, the worth of different options can be
seen by the strength of the arguments supporting them
rather than which proposals are supported by the most
powerful representative or the largest number of people
(p.8) [29].

This argument strongly resembles Habermas’ notion of
the “forceless force of the better argument,” which is
the only form of influence accepted in his ideal speech
situation (p.108) [32].
In summary, while practitioners’ notion of who their
platforms are meant to reach aligns with Noveck’s
overall, the model of participation they are trying to
achieve is different from hers: while many of the
CrowdLaw platforms integrate some elements that are
consistent with Noveck’s crowdsourcing model, a core
design feature of most of the platforms is a discussion
forum. Additionally, many of the practitioners see the
forum’s core function as facilitating deliberation, or at
least a kind of discussion that resembles deliberation.
This section has looked at practitioners’ intentions
regarding how inclusive their platforms are supposed to
be, and the type of participation they are supposed to
generate. The following section will consider the
available evidence to see how well their platforms
actually deliver on these intentions.

3.2. What platform design and performance tell
us about CrowdLaw
3.2.1. Method of platform analysis. As evidence of the
platforms’ performance, the author relied on two
platforms, Legislation Lab [33] and Mudamos [34] that
actually tracked their user statistics on their platforms.
This was supplemented with more basic information
that the Neos Lab [35] provided about the number of
participants in each of its forums.
To paint a picture of the platforms’ design, the
author relied on the CrowdLaw platforms described by
the practitioners that had a discoverable online presence,
and were in a language that the author could understand,
or translate. Three platforms fit this description:
Legislation Lab, Neos Lab and Mudamos. The study
also made some inferences about two other platform that

had only a partial presence (Marco Civil [36]) or no
discoverable presence online (Icon Libya), based on
statements the author could find on the platform’s
design. In the case of Marco Civil, these inferences were
drawn both from Lemos’ description of the platform at
the conference, and from additional descriptions of the
platform that the author found on Marco Civil’s home
page, while in the case of Icon Libya, the author relied
exclusively on Deely’s descriptions at the conference,
which were quite detailed.
3.2.2. What platform performance tells us about how
inclusive CrowdLaw is. Going off of the available
evidence, the track record for inclusivity is pretty
dismal. Even by Noveck’s standard of generating high
participation, Crowdlaw platforms fail spectacularly:
While according to Tarik Nesh Nash, 200,000 people
visited his website Reforme.ma in Morocco (the
prototype for Legislation Lab) within two months of the
launch of the platform, according to the Legislation
Lab’s user statistics, the participation numbers are much
humbler. The policy text on the platform that attracted
the most user participation (the Chilean constitution)
drew only fifty-five participants, and 243 comments for
129 articles. Mudamos and the Neos Lab fare only
slightly better. Ronaldo Lemos, when describing
Plataforma Brasil, the precursor to Mudamos, reported
at the conference that the platform received
approximately 35,000 votes. But the user statistics for
Mudamos only show a participation rate of 250 people.
The Neos Lab’s website does not display comprehensive
user statistics, but a look at their website’s list of
roughly one hundred theme groups reveals that about
one third of them have only one participant, while only
about one fifth of them have more than ten participants
(with the largest rate of participation for any one group
being forty-five people). These numbers seem roughly
consistent with the platform’s spokesperson’s self-report
of a few hundred participants.
Judging by the available demographic data that
Legislation Lab and Mudamos provided, the platforms
fail even more starkly at achieving a few of the
practitioners’ aspiration of creating representative
participation and expanding participation to excluded
groups: of the participants contributing feedback to the
Chilean constitution on Legislation Lab, only 17% of
the participants were female, and on Mudamos, that
proportion was 14%. In addition, over fifty percent of
contributors to Mudamos’ discussion about public
security came from the public security sector. The
discussion on La Constitucion de Todos also likely
attracted many participants that were not concerned in
first line by the question of Chilean constitutional
reform, because close to a quarter of contributors were
from outside Chile.
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3.2.3. What platform design tells us about the
CrowdLaw model of participation. The available data
on platform use and participant demographics reveal
that the CrowdLaw platforms do not seem to be the
intrinsic tools to generate online participation that
CrowdLaw practitioners often expect them to be. How
well then do they succeed in really creating the model of
participation that they describe in their statements?
The author finds from analyzing the available
evidence on the five platforms mentioned in section
3.2.1. that the platforms seem to fall broadly into two
types in terms of the model of participation that they
encourage: The first type, comprised of Legislation Lab,
Marco Civil, and Mudamos, is made up of simple
platforms constructed around the single function of
soliciting popular input on a single legal text. According
to Lemos, and Lemos et al. (2014), the Marco Civil and
Mudamos platforms are slightly more complex, in that
they elicit input from participants in several phases, first
on a white paper, then on the text of legislation, and that
the type of input elicited is different at different phases
[28]. But all three platforms have in common that at any
given phase the type of participation facilitated is singletiered: in other words, all participants accessing the
platform are given the same opportunities to participate.
On the other hand, the design of the platforms of
the second type (Neos Lab and Icon Libya) is much
more complex, incorporating multiple functions, and
their participation model is two-tiered: the majority of
participants are only able to submit input in a way that is
discrete and unidirectional, similarly to traditional
crowdsourcing. Only a minority of participants has
access to more complex tasks like deliberating or
contributing to the drafting of legal documents.

Figure 1. Legislation Lab interface
Legislation Lab (fig. 1) is the simplest of all three
platforms: it has a very simple design, which allows
users to leave comments, vote, or edit small sections of
a law or petition, and to navigate between those sections
using a menu. The voting feature is consistent with
traditional crowdsourcing, but in theory, the platform
also allows for deliberation, because of the comment

and editing features. However, the way the platform is
designed also fragments discussion by structuring the
comments around small sections of a legislative text,
instead of through an open forum or around broader
topics. In addition, the potential for communication is
limited in the revision feature, because, while it does
allow for comments to be made under an edited piece of
text, it requires participants to click on the profile
picture of an editor in order to see the edited version of
the text. This limits the extent to which the editing of the
law or petition can become a communicative or
collaborative process.
The basic input structure of the Marco Civil and
Mudamos is the same as that of the Legislation Lab –
comments that can be appended to each paragraph of a
legal text – thus, with the possibility for communication,
but not deliberation-friendly in design. However, in
contrast to Legislation Lab, both Marco Civil and
Mudamos incorporate opportunities for communication
between participants into their design, albeit
peripherally, by redirecting longer comments or
comment strings to independent discussion forums. That
said, as with Legislation Lab, the platforms only allow
participants to provide feedback on the law, and not to
shape the text of the law directly.
In summary, what can be said about all three
platforms is that they allow for fairly equal
participation, but limit participants’ freedom to choose
the terms of their involvement, and their opportunity to
participate in online discussions. While the Marco Civil
and Mudamos platforms do incorporate some discussion
forums into their platform, these forums are only a
peripheral part of their design.
In contrast, the platforms in the second group, Neos
Lab and Icon Libya, allow participants to contribute
directly to the drafting of legislation: For example, the
Neos Lab allows some participants to join theme groups
where they can participate in discussions and
collectively draft white papers that are then posted on
the website, under the rubric “Aktuelle Begutachtung”
(Under current review). And the platform of Icon Libya
has a section called “Write the constitution,” where
participants can either edit the text of the actual
constitution or contribute to the drafting of an informal
“civil constitution.”
However, this function is only available to a
minority of users: In the case of Neos Lab (fig. 2),
participants can only join the theme group discussions
by contacting the group moderators and getting vetted
by them. In the case of Icon Libya, this type of
participation is for the most part only open to experts,
according to Deely. For the majority of users on both
platforms, the opportunities provided by the design to
submit input are decidedly more aggregative: In the case
of the Neos Lab, the platform allows three main avenues
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for general input: submitting a suggestion form,
submitting an inquiry form, and commenting on white
papers put out by the discussion groups. Even then, an
examination of the comments reveals that most are from
participants in the theme groups, or people affiliated
with the party. In the case of Icon Libya, general
feedback comes mostly in the form of short videos
uploaded by users to the platform, which according to
Deely will then be used to create a video to present to
the constitution drafters.

Figure 2. Neos Lab interface: Economy theme
group
In summary, while the Neos Lab and Icon Libya do
a better job than their counterparts at fostering an open
discussion between some of their participants, these
participants only constitute a minority of the users of the
platform, making these features on the platforms look
less like a democratic innovation and more like a
privilege.
In sum, if we compare the five platforms’
performance with CrowdLaw practitioners’ stated goals
for their platforms’ performance, we find that none of
them quite succeed in conforming to practitioners’
stated intention: While many practitioners see their
platforms as a space to facilitate deliberation, or at least
a kind of discussion resembling deliberation, their
platforms for the most part only facilitate discussion in a
superficial way, and for the most part do not incorporate
any design features intended to facilitate a deeper and
more rule-based discussion – and when they do provide
opportunities for more deliberative discussion, this type
of participation is limited to a minority of vetted
participants, who tend to be insiders already.

4. Discussion & Conclusion
Proponents of CrowdLaw have made the case
that it constitutes a democratizing innovation. This
study asks whether CrowdLaw platforms actually live
up to their democratizing potential. To answer this
question, this study considers both the breadth and

scope of participation that CrowdLaw practitioners
want to generate and how they are actualized on the
platforms.
The analysis found discrepancies between
practitioners’ statements and the actual functioning and
interface of the platforms both in breadth and scope. In
terms of breadth, practitioners made the assumption that
CrowdLaw platforms would naturally attract high
participation, and claimed participation numbers as
high as 15,000 on their platforms, but available data on
platform usage shows participation rates that never
exceeded 250 people. In terms of scope of participation,
for the most part practitioners agreed that they wanted
to encourage discussion between participants on their
platforms. Some even thought of the discussion they
wanted to create in ways that were consistent with
deliberation. A look at the actual platforms showed that
most of them did indeed have features that allowed
participants to have online conversations. But the
analysis did not reveal any features that would move
superficial online conversations to more deliberative
ones; while some CrowdLaw practitioners did
formulate some requirements on the type of
conversation they wanted to encourage, these did not
seem to translate into their design.
In addition to the discrepancies between
practitioners’ statements and platforms’ performance,
the analysis uncovered the following thing:
participants’ notion of who the participants were that
they were trying to reach seemed undertheorized, and
when practitioners did define who they were, it became
clear that they were not of one mind: some wanted to
make participation more representative or more
egalitarian, explicitly stating the intention to extend
participation to “non-experts”, while others specifically
targeted experts. Some even described a tiered model of
participation, where experts and other types of insiders
could have access to more expansive forms of
participation, while the rest of participants only had
access to a narrower, usually one-directional form of
participation, more in line with conventional
crowdsourcing.

4.1. Who participates on CrowdLaw platforms?
Judging from the available data, CrowdLaw
platforms do nothing in and of themselves to generate
democratic participation, much less representative
democratic participation. The failure of the CrowdLaw
platforms in this study to generate anything resembling
robust participation stands as a stark reminder of a
ubiquitous reality that is often overshadowed by our
everyday experience of Internet virality: while in theory
the Internet connects everyone who has an Internet
connection, in most cases having an online presence
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expands one’s reach only insignificantly without
recourse to other (and in many cases much more timetested) means of generating participation. This
phenomenon has been amply demonstrated by
quantitative researchers: for example, Goel, Watts and
colleagues find that less than 3% of individual
communications on the Internet spread to more than
four people, and mass media is still overwhelmingly
responsible for the diffusion of what we think of as
“viral” content on the Internet [37, 38].
CrowdLaw practitioners, when they obscure the low
participation levels on their platforms, and to a lesser
extent the GovLab and Noveck, when they treat the
Internet as a kind of silver bullet for harnessing popular
participation, misrepresent the contribution CrowdLaw
platforms are capable of making to democracy. That
said, the idea that CrowdLaw platforms could be a
“democratic innovation” need not be discarded
altogether. Other ways of recruiting participants have
been deployed successfully to achieve representative
participation (at least up to a point), and if they were
employed in concert with a CrowdLaw platform, the
question still remains whether the model of
participation enacted on the platform could be
considered a democratic advance.

4.2. What is
participation?

the

CrowdLaw

model

of

So should the model of participation on CrowdLaw
platforms be considered a democratic advance?
According to Cohen (1998), a democratic model of
participation should give people bound by a collective
decision an equal chance to influence that decision [39].
While any actual system is bound to fall short of this
principle, we can ask whether the CrowdLaw model
succeeds or could potentially succeed in creating a
system that brings us closer to this ideal.
Let’s begin by considering the GovLab’s definition
of CrowdLaw as simply crowdsourced lawmaking,
without including a mechanism for online deliberation.
A mechanism for online deliberation is not part of its
definition. Should we feel satisfied that such a model
could extend democratic participation? I would argue
that no: if CrowdLaw was reduced to crowdsourcing
participant feedback on policy, it would be tough to
distinguish from polling, but with smaller and less
representatives samples.
What makes the CrowdLaw model interesting is
that, according to practitioners’ understanding of it, it
includes a mechanism for online discussion, perhaps
even deliberation. Deliberation has been identified by a
variety of theorists and researchers as a mechanism that
can extend democratic participation: because it allows
for more informed decision-making, encourages

participants to revise their positions to move closer to
the common good, provides them with the knowledge
they need to better exercise their rights and duties as
citizens, confers more legitimacy to decisions, and
strives to reach a solution that is acceptable to all
participants, not just to a majority [16, 17, 30, 32, 39,
40].
Researchers have similarly written about the
benefits of online deliberation. While the Internet is far
from being the magic tool for generating participation
that CrowdLaw practitioners and the GovLab have
made it out to be, it is still a powerful way of erasing
spatial boundaries between people who want to be
connected (at least on the digital side of the digital
divide). Iyengar, Luskin and Fishkin (2003) argue that
online deliberation can significantly cut the time and
cost of face-to-face deliberation [41]. And they also
find, along with other researchers, that online
deliberation successfully approximates face-to-face
deliberation [17, 42, 43].
However, a look at the actual platform interfaces
reveals that, while they do allow participants to have
discussion, they do not reveal many design features that
could encourage participants to have discussions that are
closer to deliberation. More fundamentally, of all the
projects that could credibly have an impact on the policy
making process, Podemos and Open Ministry were the
only one that showed no evidence of violating Cohen’s
(1998) principle of equal influence [39] – and that might
have been because the Podemos and Open Ministry
platforms could not be included in the analysis. All
others showed evidence of a tiered participation model,
either in the platform interfaces (Neos Lab and Icon
Libya) or in the descriptions of the practitioners at the
conference (Icon Libya, Marco Civil, Plataforma Brasil,
Mudamos). There is also a more fundamental problem
with some of the platforms that would probably be
difficult to address through design changes: this is the
problem of the tiered model of participation the author
found on the platforms Neos Lab and Icon Libya, and
also noted in the Brazilian projects.
That Neos Lab and Icon Libya restricted the
opportunities for discussion and legal drafting to a
minority of participants, and that the important
discussion and decision-making happened off of the
Brazilian platforms, is a sign that existing power holders
may be less willing to cede control to citizens than they
would like people to believe. At the same time, there is
also evidence that it may be inherently difficult, even
impossible to scale deliberation the same way as more
conventional crowdsourcing inputs. Mansbridge (1983)
notes that the larger the size of the group trying to reach
a decision through deliberation, the less likely that the
communicative conditions required for deliberation will
be met [16]. In addition, the more diverse the
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deliberative group’s interests are, the more likely an
attempt at deliberation is to lead to coercion [16, 44].
All this suggests that perhaps we should not expect
platforms like the Neos Lab and Icon Libya to scale
deliberation to their entire platform. Rather, if we want
to create deliberative platforms that allow for equal
participation, we might want to create smaller platforms,
and deploy them in a more local context. Moreover,
following most empirical research on deliberation, we
might want to be wary of taking a one-size-fits-all
approach to deploying deliberative CrowdLaw
platforms that ignores the particularities of the local
context [17].

4.3. Is crowdsourced deliberation a promising
model to extend democratic participation?
So far, we’ve seen that there isn’t much evidence
that CrowdLaw as it’s done in practice really constitutes
a democratizing innovation. But if online deliberation
can’t be scaled, what does this tell us about the potential
of crowdsourced deliberation in general to extend
democratic participation?
There is one reason the CrowdLaw model shouldn’t
necessarily be discarded in favor of online deliberation:
Aitamurto (2016), writing about what she calls
“crowdsourced democratic deliberation,” points out that
one of its defining characteristics is that it is embedded
in a larger process of policymaking, or at least gathering
information for policymaking [45]. While not all the
platforms I analyzed conformed to this criteria
(Legislation Lab, as far as I can tell, is completely
unmoored from any policymaking process), most
platforms demonstrate a remarkably diverse integration
into the larger policymaking process, demonstrating
their versatility: Icon Libya, for example, was a UNbased effort, and fostered connections to universities,
NGOs, and other forms of civil societies, according to
its spokesperson Sean Deely. The negotiation of the
Marco Civil involved a complex network of
governmental and non-governmental stakeholders [23,
46], while the Neos Lab platform is directly connected
to the legislative process through the nine seats its party
holds in parliament [47].
This study only opens a small window into the
world of e-participation interventions that are allegedly
remaking the policy-making process. More research is
needed in order to get an overview of the types of
efforts that are occurring in this area. More in-depth
research is also required in order to understand the
effect of these interventions on the policy-making
process, and the factors (like design choices, integration
into the policy-making process) that moderate that
effect. Hopefully what this study could show is that this
is an area well worth looking into: both to keep the

people honest who claim to use technology for
democratic ends, and to apply the insights we can draw
from academic work on democracy and the social
capabilities of the Internet to contribute to the work of
actually making our society more democratic.
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